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vent the law? 7 Or should they be couched in generalities so that the licens-
ing board may have a free hand in regulating the class licensed? Somewhere
a middle ground must be struck. A statute does not provide sufficient
warning or an adequate standard of adjudication when conduct is judged
after the fact by a court's or an administrative board's opinion of what the
statute then meant.
Robert A. Hyerle*
67But Mr. Justice Holmes has pointed out: "The fact that [he] desired to evade
the law, as it is called, is immaterial, because the very meaning of a line in the law
is that you intentionally may go as close to it as you can if you do not pass it." Superior
Oil Co. v. Mississippi, 280 U.S. 390, 395 (1930).
* Member, Second Year Class.
INSOLVENCY AS GROUNDS FOR DISCIPLINING A LICENSED
CONTRACTOR
There has been a recent efflux of criticism of our burgeoning occupa-
tional licensing laws.' Statutes regulating the constitutionally protected
right2 of one to pursue his chosen occupation have been passed in many
states,3 including California.4 Our legislature has seen fit to decree conditions
which one must fulfill before acquiring the "privilege"5 of performing such
diverse tasks as cleaning finger nails6 and erecting buildings.7 One may well
entertain doubts whether these sweeping laws, restricting as they do com-
petition and free access to the employment market, are truly fulfilling their
purpose of protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people.8 Even
if one accepts occupational licensing in theory, he may question the pro-
priety of specific enactments. This note calls into question the expediency
and constitutional validity of those provisions in the Contractors' License
' See, e.g., Monaghan, The Constitution and Occupational Licensing in Massachu-
setts, 41 B.U.L. REv. 157 (1961); Clark, Occupational Licensing in the Building Indus-
try, 1952 WASH. U.L.Q. 483.
2 In Bautista v. Jones, 25 Cal. 2d 746, 749, 155 P.2d 343, 345 (1944), the Supreme
Court observed, "The right to work, either in employment or independent business, is
fundamental and, no doubt, enjoys the protection of the personal liberty guarantee of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the federal Constitution as well as the more specific
provisions of our state Constitutions," see also Monaghan, supra note 1.
3 See 33 Am. JutR. Licenses § 17 (1941).
4 See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 1-30047; 31 CAL. Jun. 2d Licenses § 9 (1956);
11 CAL. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 170 (1953).
5 This constitutionally protected right to pursue one's chosen occupation has been
referred to as a privilege when subjected to legislative regulation. See, e.g., Rosenblatt
v. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69, 74, 158 P.2d 199, 204 (1945): "A li-
cense has none of the elements of a contract and does not confer an absolute right but
a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions and such as may there-
after be reasonably imposed."
6 CAL. Bus. & PRoF. CODE § 7321.
7 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7002.
8 See Monaghan, supra note 1, at 164; Clark, note 1, at 536.
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Law9 which require restitution of discharged trade debts as a condition of
license reinstatement.
Section 7113.5
The purpose of the Contractors' License Law is to protect the public
against "incompetent, inexperienced, unlawful and fraudulent acts of build-
ing contractors." 0 As in other chapters of the Business and Professions
Code, various acts or omissions are prescribed in the Contractors' License
Law as causes for disciplinary action." The penalty for a violation of any
of these sections may be temporary suspension or permanent revocation of
the contractor's license.' 2 Included among the various acts or omissions
constituting causes for disciplinary action are those which indicate financial
irresponsibility and incompetency.' 3 Added to this list in 1959 was section
7113.5,14 providing for disciplinary action against a licensee who fails to pay
in full obligations incurred by him as a contractor, whether because of an
adjudication in bankruptcy or other acts of insolvency.' 5 The section was
apparently enacted on the recommendation of the Contractors' License
Board to provide a handy tool for disciplining unworthy contractors. Viola-
tions of the section are readily discoverable from notices of bankruptcies
published in daily legal publications, and easily proved because an adjudi-
cation in bankruptcy is admissible as evidence in an administrative hearing.'
Since it has become law, section 7113.5 has been relied upon by the board
more often than any other section as a disciplinary measure.' 7
Expediency
An analysis of the existing grounds for disciplinary action in the Contrac-
tors' License Law indicates that the bankruptcy section is unnecessary for
9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7000-158.
10 16 CAL. ADM. CODE § 701 (1948); see also Lewis & Queen v. N. M. Ball Sons,
48 Cal. 2d 141, 149-50, 308 P.2d 713, 718 (1957); Fraenckel v. Bank of America, 40
Cal. 2d 845, 848, 256 P.2d 569 (1953); Matchett v. Gould, 131 Cal. App. 2d 821,
281 P.2d 524 (1955); Oddo v. Hedde, 101 Cal. App. 2d 375, 382, 225 P.2d 929, 934
(1950); Howard v. State, 85 Cal. App. 2d 361, 193 P.2d 11 (1948); West Coast Home
Improvement Co. v. Contractors' State License Bd., 72 Cal. App. 2d 287, 301, 302, 164
P.2d 811, 818, 819 (1945). See also Clark, supra note 1, at 522. For the statutory
definition of a contractor, see CAL. Bus. & PROF. § 7026.
"1 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7101-124.
12 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7090.
13 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7108 (misuse of funds), 7120 (withholding money).
14 Cal. Stat. 1959, ch. 1361 § 1, p. 3632; as amended Cal. Stat. 1961, ch. 1636 § 7,
p. 3574; as amended Cal. Stat. 1963, ch. 991 § 1, p. 2253. For information concerning
the effect of the 1963 amendment see 38 CAL. S. BA J. 614 (1963).
' Acts of insolvency which are causes for discipline are assignments for the benefit
of creditors, trusteeship, dissolution, composition, arrangement, or reorganization. CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7113.5.16 CAL. Gov. CODE § 11513(C).
1 CoNTAcrons' LICENsEBoAte Disciplinary Actions-Statewide 1961-62: §§ 7113.5
(bankruptcy): 267 violations; 7113 (breach of contract): 151 violations; 7120 (with-
holding of funds): 123 violations; total violations for the fiscal year, all sections, 1225;
1962-63: §§ 7113.5: 345 violations; 7113: 154 violations; 7120: 173 violations; total vio-
lations for the year, all sections, 1271. Statistics are taken from the files in the Contrac-
tors' State License Board's Investigator's Office, San Francisco, Calif.
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the efficient regulation of the industry. Many of the causes of insolvency and
hence bankruptcy are acts or omissions which constitute causes for disci-
plinary action. For example, any one or a combination of the following
violations may lead to bankruptcy: abandoning projects, 8 diverting funds,29
failing to keep records,20 breaching contracts, 2' wilfully failing to carry on
a job with reasonable diligence,22 wilfully failing to pay matured trade ob-
ligations, 23 fraud, 24 and dishonesty.25 Thus a contractor who has been adju-
dicated a bankrupt or committed an act of insolvency will in all probability
be subject to license suspension or revocation for violation of one or more
of the disciplinary sections of the Contractors' License Law, other than
section 7113.5. Since published notices of bankruptcies could be used to
discover violators of these other sections, the bankruptcy section is not an
essential tool for disciplining unworthy contractors. It is nevertheless a
useful tool since bankruptcy will be easier to prove than some of the other
enumerated violations.
Constitutionality
While insolvency is far from conclusive evidence that the contractor is
incompetent, inexperienced, unlawful or fraudulent, it is some indication
that he is guilty of one or more of those deficiencies against which the public
is to be protected by Contractors' License Law.2 In light of the familiar
reluctance of the courts to question the expediency and wisdom of economic
legislation,2 the reasonable relation 2s between the provisions of section
7113.5 and the evils which the license law was designed to prevent should
be sufficient to protect the section from a due process attack.
18 CAL. Bus. & Por. CODE § 7107.
'9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7108.2 0 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7111.
21 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7113.
22CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7119.
2
3 CAL. Bus. & ThoF. CODE § 7120.
24 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7116.
25 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7120.
26 See text at note 10 supra. In a case where insolvency is unrelated to the compe-
tency of a contractor, the registrar may exercise his discretion in a manner fairest to
the licensee. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7090. For the procedure for reviewing an
abuse of administrative discretion, see CAL. Gov. CODE § 11523 and CAL. CODE Civ.
PRoc. § 1094.5.
27Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Day-Brite Lighting v. Missouri,
342 U.S. 421 (1952); In re Porterfield, 28 Cal. 2d 91, 168 P.2d 706 (1946); Hart v.
City of Beverly Hills, 11 Cal. 2d 343, 79 P.2d 1080 (1938); Justesen's Food Stores, Inc.
v. City of Tulare, 43 Cal. App. 2d 616, 111 P.2d 424 (1941).
28 Serve Yourself Gasoline Stations Assoc. Inc. v. Brock, 39 Cal. 2d 813, 249 P.2d
545 (1952). In Rosenblatt v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 69 Cal. App. 2d 69,
72, 158 P.2d 199, 202 (1945), the court said, "it is conceded that every citizen has a
right to follow any lawful business or profession which is not injurious to the public
or a menace to the health, safety or welfare of society, free from regulation by the exer-
cise of the police power of the state except in cases of necessity for such health, safety
or welfare, and when its authority is so interposed in behalf of the public it must be by
means reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of that purpose." (Emphasis added.)
See also Comment, 40 HAiv. L. REv. 943, 953, 955 (1927).
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Satisfaction of Discharged Trade Obligations as Condition of License
Reinstatement
However, the contractor whose license has been revoked because of an
adjudication in bankruptcy and who is granted a discharge under the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Act2" may not obtain reinstatement unless he satisfies in
full those trade obligations of which he has been rdlieved by federal law.30
This requirement arguably violates both the supremacy2 ' and due process32
clauses of the Constitution.
Supremacy Clause
As stated by the Supreme Court, "One of the primary purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act is to 'relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive
indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the obligations and
responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.""2 s A state law pro-
viding that a bankrupt contractor remains legally obligated to pay dis-
charged trade debts would clearly violate the supremacy clause of the
federal Constitution. The Contractors' License Law requirement, depriving
the bankrupt contractor of the benefit of a discharge only if he chooses to
procure reinstatement of his license, though not so clearly unconstitutional,
does clearly contravene one of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act.
In Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety"4 the Supreme Court recently
had before it a state statute similar in import to section 7113.5. The Utah
motor vehicle responsibility law requires satisfaction of judgments resulting
from automobile accidents as a condition of driver's license reinstatement,
and specifies that a discharge in bankruptcy does not relieve the judgment
debtor from the requirement. The statute further provides that the judg-
ment debtor may obtain reinstatement upon receiving the written consent
29 11 U.S.C. §32(a) (1958).
30 CAL. Bus. & ThOF. CODE § 7102: "After revocation of a license upon any of the
grounds set forth in this article, the license shall not be reinstated or reissued within a
period of one year after the final decision of revocation and then only on proper showing
that all loss caused by the act or omission for which the license was revoked has been
fully satisfied .... (Emphasis added.) This section, therefore, requires that all losses,
including debts discharged in bankruptcy, must be satisfied as a condition for license
reinstatement. This section would apply not only to section 7113.5, but also to a viola-
tion of any disciplinary section which resulted in a discharge of unpaid trade debts. For
example, a licensee who breaches a contract violates section 7113; if his license is re-
voked and he is adjudicated a bankrupt, he must pay the discharged debts before his
license will be reinstated.
31 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
32 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
33 Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934); 11 U.S.C. § 35 (1958). "A
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts... Wil-
liams v. United States Fidelity Co., 236 U.S. 549 (1915); Bifdnd, Discharge of Debts
in Bankruptcy and Some Problems Relating Thereto, 7 N.Y.L.F. 354 (1961). See also,
MAcLAcHLAN, BANxurrcy § 100 (1956); Hartman, The Dischargeability of Debts in
Bankruptcy, 15 V.r. L. REv. 13 (1961); Ungerman, Discharge: The Prime Mover of
Bankruptcy, 36 REF. J. 85 (1962); Nadler, The Humaneness of the Bankruptcy Law,
60 CoM. L.J. 149 (1955)
84 369 U.S. 153 (1962).
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of the judgment creditor, in effect granting him a preference over other
creditors of the bankrupt.35 Despite this powerful weapon of the creditor
for the collection of a debt discharged in bankruptcy, the Court in a divided
opinion found no conflict with the Bankruptcy Act. In language perhaps
more sweeping than he intended, Mr. Justice Frankfurter said for the ma-
jority that "the Bankruptcy Act does not forbid a State to attach any con-
sequence whatsoever to a debt which has been discharged."31 Taken lit-
erally, this language indicates that the requirement that the bankrupt con-
tractor satisfy his discharged trade obligations as a condition of license rein-
statement is not an unconstitutional violation of the supremacy clause.
There are three considerations indicating that the constitutionality of the
contractor's financial responsibility provisions has not been determined by
the Kesler case. The first is that a law such as the Contractors' License Law,
depriving the bankrupt contractor of his constitutionally protected right 37
to pursue his chosen occupation, should be more carefully scrutinized than
the Utah statute, which merely deprives the bankrupt judgment debtor of
a "privilege"'' 8 of using the state's highways.
The second is that there is not nearly as great a demand to protect the
public against financially irresponsible contractors3 9 as there is for protection
against careless and irresponsible drivers. Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion
stressed the widespread adoption of state automobile financial responsibility
laws, and the legitimate and important interest of the states in making safe
their highways. 40 Thus it seems reasonable to infer that the underlying basis
for the Kesler decision was the reluctance of the Court to interfere with the
states in their exercise of police power in this vital area. However, this sen-
sitive federal-state relationship does not loom nearly as large in the area of
contractor licensing as in that of driver licensing.
Third, and probably most important, the provisions of the Utah act pre-
sent only an indirect conflict with the Bankruptcy Act, while the provisions
of the Contractors' License Law requiring full satisfaction of discharged
trade debts as a condition of license reinstatement are in direct conflict with
the federal statute. The Utah act does not proscribe financial irresponsibility
as an indication that one is an unsafe driver, but rather is designed to pro-
mote safety on the highways by imposing severe penalties on those who have
proved themselves unsafe drivers. The provisions of the Contractors' License
35 Utah Laws 1951, ch. 71 as amended, Utah Code Ann., 1953, tit. 41, ch. 12
§§ 14(b), 15.
36369 U.S. 153, 171 (1962).
37 See note 2 supra.
38 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Watson v. Division of Motor Ve-
hicles, 212 Cal. 279, 298 Pac. 481 (1931); Shivell v. Municipal Court, 188 Cal. App.
2d 333, 10 Cal. Rptr. 283 (1961).
39 Clark, supra note 1, at 539, points out that only 15 states have contractors' licens-
ing laws: Ala., Ariz., Ark., Calif., Idaho, Ind., Mont., Nev., N. Mex., N.C., N.D., S.C.,
Tenn., Utah, Va. Further research indicates that Hawaii also has contractors' licensing
regulations. HAwAI RFv. LAws ch. 166A (Supp. 1961). In addition Arizona has a
bankruptcy section; 10 WEsT's Amz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-1154.
40 369 U.S. at 169. Ten pages of majority opinion are devoted to tracing the history
of the development of state automobile financial responsibility laws. They have been
adopted by nearly every state and the District of Columbia.
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Law, on the other hand, are aimed at financial irresponsibility as such. They
proscribe bankruptcy as an indication that the contractor is one against
whom the public should be protected and deprive the bankrupt contractor
of the federal immunity afforded by the Bankruptcy Act. Thus, while Mr.
justice Frankfurter can say that the Utah act is not "directed to bankrupts
as such" 4' and is "tangential"42 to the Bankruptcy Act, the same cannot be
said of the Contractors' License Law provisions.
It is clear from the decision in the Kesler case that the states, at least
in the narrow area of automobile financial responsibility legislation, are
free to enact what are in effect exceptions to the Bankruptcy Act. On
the other hand, the need for a contractors' financial responsibility law
should not be sufficient to justify the deprivation of a federal immunity
designed to give one a fresh start in life, where in order to make that start
he must obtain reinstatement of his license. Since it is axiomatic that only
Congress may enact exceptons to federal laws, there should be no hesitation
on the part of any court, state or federal, to strike down a state statute
which encroaches on this exclusive power of Congress. It is to be expected
that the doctrine of the Kesler case will not be extended.
Due Process Clause
Although the California courts have assumed the position of the Supreme
Court in exercising judicial self-restraint, and disavow any inclination to
investigate the wisdom of economic legislation,4 3 it is also doubtful that the
provisions in question could withstand the due process attack. While legis-
lation need not be wise, it must at least be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose for which it was intended. 4 Legislation
which restricts one in the exercise of his constitutionally protected right to
pursue his chosen occupation should be subjected to close scrutiny under
this requirement. To require the contractor whose obligations have been
discharged in bankruptcy to satisfy those obligations in full as a condition
of reinstatement is patently to punish the contractor rather than to protect
the public. The requirement decreases the chances that a contractor who
has been granted a discharge in bankruptcy or has reached a settlement with
creditors will be able to return to business. And it increases the chances that
the contractor who does return to business will be forced once again into
an act of insolvency by depleting his newly acquired assets before he has
the opportunity to apply them to his business. Since the justification for
occupational licensing laws is protection of the public rather than punish-
ment of the licensee,4 5 the requirement that the bankrupt contractor pay
41 Id. at 174.
42 Ibid.
43 Lelande v. Lowery, 26 Cal. 2d 224, 157 P.2d 639 (1945); Justesen's Food Stores,
Inc. v. City of Tulare, 43 Cal. App. 2d 616, 111 P.2d 424 (1941); People v. Velarde,
45 Cal. App. 520, 188 Pac. 59 (1920).
44 See note 28 supra. See also Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal.
2d 228, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962).
45 "It is well settled that the revocation or suspension of a license is not penal in
nature but is a mechanism by which licensees who have demonstrated their ignorance,
incompetency or lack of honesty and integrity may be removed from the licensed busi-
ness. The legislation was not intended to provide for punishment but to afford protection
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in full his discharged obligations is therefore arbitrary, unreasonable, and
hence an unconstitutional exercise of the state's police power.46
Conclusion
To strike down the provisions in question only on the basis that they
violate the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment would avoid
the task of distinguishing the Kesler case. However, in order to deter future
state legislation from encroaching on one of the primary purposes of the
Bankruptcy Act, it is urged that the provisions be struck down as a.violation
of both the supremacy and due process clauses.
The constitutional issues raised by the insolvency provisions in the Con-
tractors' License Law highlight the important responsibility of the legisla-
ture in enacting occupational regulatory provisions. Since this legislation is
often proposed by groups whose sole concern is not the public welfare,47
it is the responsibility of the legislature to insure that the laws are truly for
the purpose of protecting the health, safety and welfare of the people. And
while proposed regulatory provisions may appear to be reasonable, and
hence constitutionally valid, they are not always expedient and necessary.
Thus a more careful examination of these provisions is necessary to prevent
inexpedient and unnecessary restrictions on one's right to pursue his chosen
occupation.
Wendell W. Mew*
of the public." Meade v. State Collection Agency Bd., 181 Cal. App. 2d 774, 776, 5 Cal.
Rptr. 486, 487 (1960); Brodsky v. California State Bd. of Pharmacy, 173 Cal. App. 2d
680, 688, 344 P.2d 68, 74 (1959). But see CAr.. Bus. & PROF. CoDo § 7030: "Any
person who acts in the capacity of a contractor without a license is guilty of a mis-
demeanor."
46A bankrupt may receive the benefit of a discharge only once every six years;
therefore, chances that a contractor would abuse this right to circumvent the purpose
of the Contractors' License Law are unlikely. See 11 U.S.C. § 32(c) (5) (1958). In
1963, section 7071.9 was added to the Contractors' License Law providing that a $1,000
bond must be posted as a condition for issuance and reinstatement of a license. Cal.
Stat. 1963, ch. 1971 § 1, p. 4048. This requirement may also be of doubtful validity.
47See note 1 supra. See also Blumenthal v. Board of Medical Examiners, 57 Cal.
2d 228, 18 Cal. Rptr. 501, 368 P.2d 101 (1962); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 7001-02.
The Contractors' License Board is composed of eight licensed contractors and one public
member.
* Member, Second Year Class.
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